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Comments
Recent Efforts to Limit
Federal Court Jurisdiction and Remedies:
A Circumvention of the Amendment Process?
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to its adjournment, the 97th Congress was considering
legislation which sought to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, to decide constitu-
tional law cases involving the issues of public school busing and
regulation of abortion.' Although this was not the first congres-
sional effort to limit federal court jurisdiction under the article III
exceptions clause,2 this most recent effort was significant because it
1. Specifically, the following bills had been introduced in the 97th Congress:
S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONG. RIc. 287-88 (1981), which declared that human
life begins at conception; would allow states to enact anti-abortion laws, and would prevent
lower federal courts from invalidating any new state anti-abortion statutes.
S. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 10,191 (1981), which would prevent fed-
eral courts from ordering busing, pupil assignments, teacher transfers, or school closings as a
means of desegregating schools.
S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONG. REc. 11,528-29 (1981), which contained anti-
abortion provisions similar to those of S. 158, but expressly provided an avenue of appeal,
for challenges of state anti-abortion statutes, to the United States Supreme Court and
would entitle such cases to expedited treatment by the Supreme Court.
S. 1743, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONG. Rc. 11,514 (1981), which contained anti-bus-
ing provisions similar to S. 1647.
S. 1760, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. Rac. 11,819 (1981), which would prevent fed-
eral courts from ordering pupil assignments or busing for school desegregation; contained a
dissolution provision applicable to existing desegregation orders entitling individuals or
school authorities subject to such an order to seek relief from that order in any court, which
relief must be granted unless the court can make certain specific findings regarding the need
for continuation of the order.
Additionally, H.R. 72, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 33 (1981), and S. 1742, 97th
Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONG. REc. 11,514 (1981), which would deprive the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts of jurisdiction to hear cases involving voluntary school prayer, were
introduced in the 97th Congress, but will not be discussed in this comment. However, the
discussion concerning the due process problems which would arise if a state court were free
to sustain the validity of state anti-abortion statutes which violate the guidelines of a
United States Supreme Court decision in this area, see infra note 134 and accompanying
text, is equally applicable to cases involving state statutes allowing public school prayer.
2. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, provides in relevant part: "In all the other Cases
before mentioned [in art. III, § 2, cl. 1], the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction,
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came at a time when highly vocal movements existed in support of
passage of constitutional amendments designed to limit busing for
school desegregation, and to overturn the controversial Supreme
Court decision in Roe v. Wade,' concerning the right of a woman
to obtain an abortion. This proposed legislation has been viewed as
an effort to circumvent the lengthy and difficult constitutional
amendment process" defined in article V of the Constitution.5 It
has rekindled the debate over the extent of Congress' authority to
limit or regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts and the Supreme
Court, particularly when such limitations and regulations are per-
ceived as having the potential to effectuate substantive changes in
existing constitutional law.
Although article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution,
on its face, appears to grant Congress the explicit authority to
limit or regulate the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction," a
more controversial question centers not on the existence of con-
gressional authority under article III to restrict the jurisdiction of
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make." Id.
Other unsuccessful efforts to limit federal court jurisdiction included S. 2646, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REC. 18,687 (1958) (would have limited Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion to review cases involving state and federal anti-subversion regulations, and cases involv-
ing contempt of Congress), and H.R. 11926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. 22,104
(1964) (would have deprived federal courts and the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear
cases involving plaintiffs seeking to force reapportionment of state legislatures). Both pro-
posals were defeated in the Senate. See 104 CONG. REc. 18,687 (1958), and 110 CONG. REC.
22,104 (1964).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognized abortion as falling within a constitutionally pro-
tected right to privacy, which may not be denied until the fetus reaches the stage of "viabil-
ity" and the state's interest in protecting the potential life becomes "compelling").
4. The American Bar Association has expressed a concern that such legislation consti-
tutes an effort "to manipulate jurisdiction-including jurisdiction to grant remedies, for ex-
ample, busing-to achieve a substantive alteration of constitutional law that Congress could
not bring about by legislation or by any procedure short of constitutional amendment."
Meserve, Limiting Jurisdiction and Remedies of Federal Courts, 68 A.B.A. J. 159 (1982).
5. U.S. CONST. art. V provides in pertinent part:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-
pose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid.. . as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by
the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress ....
Id.
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. See supra note 2.
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 provides: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." Id. See also supra note 2.
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the federal courts, but rather focuses on the limitations to that au-
thority. It is this latter question which shall be addressed in this
comment. Additionally, this comment will examine the extent to
which the proposed jurisdictional and remedial restrictions comply
with the limitations to Congress' article III authority which are im-
posed by the fifth amendment due process clause,' section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment,9 and by the principle of separation of pow-
ers.10 Finally, potential factors which may have an effect on
whether or not such jurisdiction and remedy-limiting legislation, if
enacted, may substantively alter existing constitutional law, will
also be discussed.
II. THE EXTENT OF CONGRESS' ARTICLE III AUTHORITY
Article III of the Constitution of the United States is the
source of both the federal judiciary's power and Congress' author-
ity to regulate or check that power. For many years, courts and
commentators have debated the extent of this congressional au-
thority,1" particularly with regard to any limitation of lower federal
court jurisdiction to something less than the full scope of the judi-
cial power defined in article III.12 Yet, until 1976, Congress had
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part- "No person shall ... be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Id. See infra notes 133-36 and
accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 100-01 & 122-24 and accompanying text.
11. In support of broad congressional power under article III, see Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (definition of lower federal court jurisdiction is within the discre-
tion of Congress); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938) (upheld the power of
Congress to preclude federal court jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes, under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932); Anderson, The Government of Courts: The Power of
Congress Under Article III, 68 A.B.A. J. 686, 688-90 (1982).
But cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 141 (1816) (in which Justice Story
asserted in dictum that Congress was required to create lower federal courts to assume juris-
diction over those areas of the judicial power of the United States for which the Supreme
Court did not have original jurisdiction); Meserve, supra note 4; Eisenberg, Congressional
Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALu L.J. 498 (1974).
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies be-
tween two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of another State; - be-
tween Citizens of different States; - between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
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limited federal court jurisdiction in "controversies to which the
United States shall be a party . "1. 3 with the requirement that
the amount in controversy exceed $10,000," and continues to limit
federal court jurisdiction with the same $10,000 requirement in
controversies between citizens of different states, 5 without any se-
rious debate over its authority to do so.
However, these limitations are non-substantive and procedural
in nature and would not necessarily effect substantive changes in
existing law by limiting federal court or Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion over narrowly defined legal or constitutional issues. Neverthe-
less, some courts and commentators have relied on the Supreme
Court decision in Ex parte McCardle6 in support of the proposi-
tion that Congress has authority to substantively regulate Su-
preme Court appellate jurisdiction, 7 and lower federal court juris-
diction. 18 Such reliance arguably is misplaced. In McCardle, the
petitioner, who had been convicted and imprisoned by the military
government of Mississippi under the authority of the Reconstruc-
tion Acts, brought a habeas corpus action challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Reconstruction legislation. The lower court denied
habeas corpus, and McCardle appealed to the Supreme Court
under the authority of the Act of February 5, 1867,'" which simpli-
13. Id.
14. Prior to 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provided: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000 . . .and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) (amended 1976).
In 1976, this statute was amended by the Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90
Stat. 2721 (1976), which added the following at the end of the statute: "except that no such
sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United States, any
agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity." Id. It was
amended again by the Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980). The
1980 version grants federal district courts "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp.
IV 1980) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970)).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976) provides: "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000 ...and is between-(1) citizens of different states . Id.
16. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 264 (1869).
17. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 109 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); National
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing); Anderson, supra note 11, at 687-88; Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1965).
18. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), in which Justice Harlan declared
that "Congress has consistently with [article III] withdrawn the jurisdiction of this Court to
proceed with a case then sub judice, Ex parte McCardle; its power can be no less when
dealing with an inferior court." Id. at 567.
19. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (amended 1868).
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fled the appeals procedures in habeas corpus actions. After the Su-
preme Court accepted jurisdiction, but before it had rendered a
decision on the merits, Congress repealed the portion of the Act of
1867 authorizing the simplified appeals procedure. The Court com-
plied with the repeal and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-
tion. 0 However, the Court concluded its opinion by noting the lim-
ited effect of the repealing legislation, emphasizing that it only
affected the Court's appellate jurisdiction under the Act of 1867,
and not any appellate jurisdiction previously exercised pursuant to
the Constitution. 1
This principle was reinforced only several months later in the
case of Ex parte Yerger.2 2 In Yerger, as in McCardle, the peti-
tioner had been convicted and imprisoned by the military authori-
ties in Mississippi, and brought a habeas corpus action. The lower
court denied habeas corpus and Yerger appealed to the Supreme
Court under the procedure that was employed prior to the Act of
1867. The Court held that its jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
appeal brought before it under the old appeals procedure was un-
affected by the repeal of the Act of 1867, because the words of the
repealing legislation expressly applied to that Act and did not pur-
port to apply to the appellate jurisdiction granted by the Constitu-
tion.23 Indeed, the Yerger Court seemed to indicate that notwith-
standing the exceptions clause of article III, it did not accept the
principle that Congress could deprive the Supreme Court com-
pletely of appellate jurisdiction of habeas corpus cases.
2 4
20. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 266.
21. Id. The Court declared:
Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing Act in ques-
tion, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied.
But this is an error. The Act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases
but appeals from circuit courts under the Act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdic-
tion which was previously exercised.
Id. at 265-66(citation omitted).
22. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 332 (1869).
23. Id. at 339. The Court, noting that the words of the repealing legislation were clear,
asserted:
They repeal only so much of the Act of 1867 as authorized appeals, or the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction by this court. They affected only appeals and appellate jurisdic-
tion authorized by that Act. They do not purport to touch the appellate jurisdiction
conferred by the Constitution. . . . They reach no Act except the Act of 1867.
Id.
24. Id. at 338. With regard to its appellate jurisdiction under the Constitution, the
Court noted:
We agree that it is given subject to exception and regulation by Congress; but it is too
plain for argument that the denial to this court of appellate jurisdiction in this class
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Thus, opponents of the proposed legislation could make, and in
the past have made, the argument that congressional authority to
restrict federal court jurisdiction is limited to such procedure-ori-
ented legislation aimed at controlling case loads and promoting ju-
dicial efficiency.25 Supporters of the proposed legislation, on the
other hand, can advance the counter argument that regardless of
the effect of the "jurisdictional amount" statutes, or the congres-
sional intent behind their enactment,2' they are nonetheless con-
gressional limitations of lower federal court jurisdiction over cases
which are expressly within the realm of the judicial power of fed-
of cases must greatly weaken the efficacy of the writ, deprive the citizen in many
cases of its benefits, and seriously hinder the establishment of that uniformity in de-
ciding upon questions of personal rights which can only be attained through appellate
jurisdiction, exercised upon the decisions of courts of original jurisdiction.
These considerations forbid any construction giving to doubtful words the effect
of withholding or abridging [appellate] jurisdiction. They would strongly persuade
against the denial of the jurisdiction even were the reasons for affirming it less cogent
than they are.
Id.
25. See Meserve, supra note 4, at 160, where the author asserts the general proposi-
tion that "Congress had discretion to place some issues exclusively in the inferior federal
courts, exclusively in the state courts, or concurrently in the two sets of courts. Congress can
prescribe the manner in which cases go to the Supreme Court." Id. Such discretion, in ef-
fect, can enable Congress to distribute case loads among the federal and state courts, and
control the number of cases going to the Supreme Court. "
A more detailed argument concerning the extent of congressional control over federal
court jurisdiction had been made by an earlier commentator:
The availability of a federal lower court forum for each case should be sacrificed only
when providing such a forum would seriously undermine the judicial system. An over-
abundance of federal forums with unrestricted jurisdiction to hear all federal cases
could in fact undermine the judiciary ...
• . . Congress has some Article III authority to limit federal jurisdiction. The
authority to curtail, however, is limited by its origins. It cannot be used to restrict
jurisdiction over. . . any... narrowly defined class of cases that pose little threat to
efficiency... The power to curtail is limited to prudent steps which help avoid case
overloads.
Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 515-16. Further support for this argument can be found in the
legislative history of Pub. L. No. 85-554, which amended the amount-in-controversy require-
ment of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 from $3,000 to $10,000. See S. Rep. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Seas.,
reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3099.
The proposition that congressional authority to regulate federal court and Supreme
Court jurisdiction is limited to such procedural measures, is not refuted by the McCardle
and Yerger cases. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
26. In McCardle, Chief Justice Chase declared: "We are not at liberty to inquire into
the motives of the Legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution;
and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by
express words." 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 265. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 687, where the
author, a proponent of broad congressional control over federal court jurisdiction, cites the
above language in support of his position.
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eral courts under article 111.27 Thus, it appears that the point of
contention in this current debate is not whether Congress has the
authority to limit federal court jurisdiction, but rather what limita-
tions are placed upon that authority.
III. LIMITATIONS UPON CONGRESS' ARTICLE III POWER
Congress, in exercising its powers under article III, as well as
in exercising its article I enumerated powers, must comply with
constitutional limitations on these powers.29 One such limitation is
the restriction on Congress' article III power over federal court ju-
risdiction enunciated by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Klein. 0 That restriction prohibits Congress from exercising its
power to limit jurisdiction in a manner that infringes upon judicial
independence.3 1
In Klein, the administrator of the estate of a decedent whose
property had been sold by the Union during the Civil War, sued
the United States in the Court of Claims to recover the value of
the lost property pursuant to federal legislation granting such a
cause of action to persons who had never aided the Confederacy. 2
Klein was granted relief based on an earlier Supreme Court deci-
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cia. 1-18.
29. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 112
(1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. The authors apply a two prong test for constitutional-
ity of a federal action:
In order to determine whether any action of the federal government complies
with the Constitution of the United States, the federal action must be reviewed on
two bases. First, it must be determined whether the enactment is made pursuant to
one of the powers granted the federal government under the Constitution .... Sec-
ond, it must be determined whether the regulation or legislation violates some spe-
cific check on federal power, such as those contained in the Bill of Rights. Even if the
federal government is acting pursuant to one of its enumerated powers, it may not
disregard these constitutional limitations.
Id. (emphasis added).
30. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 519 (1872).
31. See NOWAK, supra note 29, at 44, where the authors state:
The decision in Klein strongly supports the contention that Congress must exercise
its power to limit jurisdiction in a matter consistent with the independence of the
judiciary. Any jurisdictional limitation must be neutral; that is, Congress may not
decide the merits of a case under the guise of limiting jurisdiction.
Id. Cf. Anderson, supra note 11, at 690, where the author, who acknowledges broad congres-
sional power to limit federal court jurisdiction, concedes "that Klein stands for the proposi-
tion that the Court will not allow Congress to use the exceptions clause to alter the proceed-
ings of the Court in favor of a particular class of parties." Id.
32. 80 U.S. at 520. See An Act to provide for the collection of abandoned property and
for the prevention of frauds in insurrectionary districts within the United States, Act of
Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820 (1863) (amended 1870).
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sion which held that a presidential pardon, which Klein's decedent
had received, conclusively proved that a claimant did not aid the
Confederacy.3 While the government's appeal was pending in the
Supreme Court, Congress passed legislation declaring that pardons
were not admissible in such cases, and depriving the Supreme
Court of jurisdiction over cases in which the plaintiff had proved
loyalty in such a manner.
The Klein Court declared this withdrawal of jurisdiction uncon-
stitutional, 4 denouncing it as a congressional effort to prescribe for
the Supreme Court a rule for decision of its cases, and as an in-
fringement of the independence of the judicial branch. 5 Thus, the
Klein decision stands for the principle that Congress may exercise
its power to restrict federal court jurisdiction only in a way which
is consistent with judicial independence. 6
Congress' power to regulate federal court jurisdiction is subject
to restrictions imposed by other portions of the Constitution as
well. This proposition would seem to follow from the well settled
principle that the substantive powers of Congress are subject to
fifth amendment due process restrictions.3 7 This latter principle
has been recognized by the Supreme Court in a number of deci-
sions concerning legislation enacted by Congress pursuant to one
of its enumerated powers. 5 The applicability of the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause limitations to regulate federal court ju-
risdiction was addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for
33. 80 U.S. at 524. See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).
34. 80 U.S. at 525.
35. Id. Chief Justice Chase, writing for the majority, declared that Congress had
"passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power." Id.
36. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. See also National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tide-
water Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1948), where the Supreme Court, while upholding a fed-
eral statute giving federal district courts jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of
the District of Columbia and citizens of a state, and involving no federal question, neverthe-
less recognized, in dictum, that "there are limits to the nature of duties which Congress may
impose on the constitutional courts vested with the federal judicial power. The doctrine of
separation of powers is fundamental in our system." Id. at 590.
37. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part that no person shall "be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1934) (invalidated
bankruptcy legislation on the grounds that it amounted to a taking of private property for
public use without just compensation); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927) and Nichols
v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927) (invalidated tax statutes on the ground that their enforce-
ment would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law); United States
v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (federal commerce power must be exercised in accordance with
the fifth amendment, when the taking of private property is involved).
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the Second Circuit in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.39 In Bat-
taglia, plaintiffs had brought suit to recover overtime pay, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938,40 for time spent on their employers' premises for incidental
activities prior to and after engagement in the plaintiffs' principal
employment activities. While these suits were pending, Congress
enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,"1 which made such inci-
dental activities non-compensable and withdrew the jurisdiction of
courts to hear pending or future cases brought under the old stat-
ute. The court of appeals held that the plaintiffs' claim for over-
time pay had been properly dismissed.42 The court reasoned that
because no property rights had vested in the plaintiffs, the Portal-
to-Portal Act did not constitute a deprivation of property without
due process of law, and the limitation on jurisdiction was valid."3
However, although the court sustained the validity of this particu-
lar withdrawal of jurisdiction, it expressly recognized that Con-
gress' power to regulate the jurisdiction of the courts was subject
to the restrictions of the fifth amendment due process clause.44
Additionally, section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 45 may be
considered another constitutional limitation on Congress' power,
even though the language of this provision appears to make it an
enabling clause. The Supreme Court defined the proper scope of
Congress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment in
Katzenbach v. Morgan.6 In Katzenbach, registered voters in New
York City brought suit challenging the constitutionality of section
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 47 which prohibited enforce-
ment of a New York state law requiring an ability to read and
39. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
40. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938)
(amended 1947).
41. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (1947) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1976)).
42. 169 F.2d at 257.
43. Id. at 259-62.
44. Id. at 257. The court stated in dictum that "while Congress has the undoubted
power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme
Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law .... " Id. (footnote omitted). Accord NOWAK, supra note
29, at 47, where the authors state that "[t]o prevent the legislature from using the federal
courts to accomplish unconstitutional ends, Congress's Article III power must be subject to
the due process guarantees of the fifth amendment." Id. (footnote omitted).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id.
46. 384 U.S. 641 (1965).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1976).
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write English as a condition of voting. The federal legislation was
upheld by the Court as a valid exercise of Congress' power under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enact appropriate legis-
lation to enforce the provisions of that amendment. 4 The Court
noted that New York's English literacy requirement effectively de-
nied the right to vote to large portions of the state's Puerto Rican
community. The Court reasoned that because section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment is an affirmative grant of legislative power al-
lowing Congress to exercise its discretion to determine whether
and what legislation is needed to enforce the provisions of that
amendment,"9 and the effect of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights
Act would be to prohibit New York's denial of the right to vote to
a large part of its Puerto Rican population, then section 4(e) could
be viewed as a legislative measure designed to further the aims of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.50 Fur-
thermore, the majority emphasized, in dictum, that Congress'
power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment is limited, by
the language of that section, to enacting appropriate legislation to
enforce, not restrict, the guarantees of that amendment." Conse-
quently, it would appear that federal legislation which would seek
to restrict or abrogate fourteenth amendment guarantees, or to di-
lute the effect of due process and equal protection decisions of the
Supreme Court,"2 would be an invalid exercise of Congress' section
48. 384 U.S. at 658.
49. Id. at 651.
50. Id. at 652. The court stated:
[Section] 4(e) may be viewed as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community
residing in New York non-discriminatory treatment by government ....
Section 4(e) may be readily seen as "plainly adapted" to furthering [the] aims of
the Equal Protection Clause. The practical effect of § 4(e) is to prohibit New York
from denying the right to vote to large segments of its Puerto Rican community.
Id.
51. Id. at 651-52 n.10. The Court distinguished between congressional efforts to en-
force and to restrict equal protection, as follows:
Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate,
or dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the States to
establish racially segregated systems of education would not be-as required by §
5-a measure "to enforce" the Equal Protection Clause since that clause of its own
force prohibits such state laws.
Id.
52. The Katzenbach majority, specifically addressing Justice Harlan's dissenting opin-
ion, declared that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment "does not grant Congress power to
exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact 'statutes so as in effect to dilute equal
protection and due process decisions of this Court.'" Id. at 651 n.10 (quoting from id. at
668, Harlan, J., dissenting).
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5 power and a denial of the due process of law guafanteed by the
fifth amendment."3
Although constitutional restrictions do exist, the Supreme Court
has also historically recognized a broad congressional power to
limit federal court jurisdiction." The ultimate question, therefore,
is whether or not Congress, if it were to enact the proposed juris-
diction and remedy limiting legislation, would in fact, exceed any
of these constitutional limitations on its power. In other words, the
focus must be on whether Congress, by limiting lower federal court
and/or Supreme Court jurisdiction to order the busing of students
in school desegregation cases, or to hear cases involving the issue of
a woman's right to an abortion, would be interfering impermissibly
with the independence of the judiciary, or violating a specific check
on Congress' power contained in other provisions of the
Constitution.5
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. The Anti-Busing Bills
The proposed jurisdiction-limiting measures in the area of
busing are ripe for close scrutiny for compliance with the Klein
and Katzenbach limitations. In two of the proposed bills," Con-
gress did not seek to limit federal court jurisdiction to hear school
desegregation cases, but rather sought to limit jurisdiction to grant
specific remedies by restricting the power of federal courts to order
the transportation or transfer of students or teachers, or to order
53. Borrowing the reasoning employed in the desegregation decision in Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), discussed infra note 88, it is submitted that in view of the fact
that the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution prohibits state action in violation of due
process and equal protection, "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government." 347 U.S. at 500. It follows, therefore, that
federal action under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment which would permit the restriction or
abrogation of the guarantees contained in that amendment, would violate the constitutional
limitation on the exercise of federal power-the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
54. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. at 401 (in which Justice White asserted
that the task of defining the jurisdiction of lower federal courts is within Congress' discre-
tion); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. at 330 (upheld the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
1932, which limited federal court jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes, on the
grounds that the limitations of such equitable jurisdiction violated no constitutional rights
or article III principles).
55. See NowAx, supra note 29, for the test of constitutionality of a federal action.
56. S. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 11,528-29 (1981) and S. 1743, 97th
Cong., lst Sess., 127 CONG. Rzc. 11,514 (1981).
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school closings for desegregation purposes.5 7 In the other proposed
anti-busing bill, 8 Congress not only sought to limit federal court
jurisdiction to grant the busing remedy,59 but also would have re-
quired courts to dissolve existing busing orders upon application
for such relief by an individual or school authority affected by the
existing order, unless certain specified findings were made with re-
gard to the continued necessity of the existing remedy."'
57. S. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) 127 CONG. REc. 11,528-29 (1981) provided in
relevant part:
Chapter 155 of title 28 of the United States Code (relating to the Congressional
power to limit the injunctive power of inferior Federal courts . . .), is amended by
adding before section 2283 the following new section:
§ 2282. Jurisdiction, limitations (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no inferior court of the United States nor any judge of any inferior court
of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any injunction, writ, pro-
cess, order, citation for or order with respect to contempt, rule, judgment, de-
cree, or command-
(1) requiring the assignment or transportation of any student to a public
elementary or secondary school operated by a State or local educational agency
for the purpose of altering the racial or ethnic composition of the student body
at any public school;
(2) requiring any State or local educational agency to close any school and
transfer the students from the closed school to any other school for the pur-
pose of altering the racial or ethnic composition of the student body at any
public school; or
(3) precluding any State or local educational agency from fulfilling any
provision of any contract between it and any member of the faculty or admin-
istration of any public school it operates specifying the public school where the
member of the faculty or administration is to perform his or her duties under
the contract ....
Id. S. 1743, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a), 127 CONG. REC. 11,514 (1981) contained identical
language.
58. S. 1760, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 11,819 (1981).
59. Id. § 5. This provision would amend 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) by designating the
existing language as section (a) and adding the following language at the end thereof:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no inferior court established by
Congress shall have jurisdiction to issue any order requiring the assignment or trans-
portation of students to public elementary or secondary schools on the basis of race,
color, or national origin or to issue any order which excludes any student from any
public school on the basis of race, color, or national origin ...
S. 1760, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 127 CONG. REC. 11,819 (1981).
60. Id. The dissolution provision would apply to court orders, entered prior to the date
of S. 1760's enactment into law, which require the assignment, transportation, or exclusion
of any student from any public school because of race. It would allow both individuals and
school authorities affected by the order "to seek relief from such order in any court ... "
Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the bill provided:
[U]nless that court can make conclusive findings based on clear and convincing evi-
dence that-
(1) the acts that gave rise to the existing court order intentionally and specifi-
cally caused, and in the absence of the order would continue intentionally and
specifically to cause students to be assigned to or excluded from public schools
460
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In analyzing the validity of the recent anti-busing proposals,
Klein, which stressed the importance of the principle of separation
of powers,"1 must be considered in light of Lauf v. E.G. Shinner &
Co.,62 which permitted congressional limitations on federal court
jurisdiction to grant specific remedies. In Lauf, the Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,6 which
restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions or
temporary restraining orders in labor disputes. " The Court recog-
nized that an employer does not have a constitutional right to have
a federal court grant an injunction in a labor dispute case.6 5 Conse-
quently, because this limitation did not violate any constitutional
rights, and the limitation on the injunctive remedy did not burden
a suspect class, the Court reasoned that Congress may limit the
federal courts' jurisdiction in this manner, provided that the limi-
tation has a rational basis.6
The provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the provisions
of one recently proposed anti-busing measure, S. 1760,7 are analo-
gous in that both measures limit federal court jurisdiction to grant
a specific remedy 8 and both measures provide for an exception to
the restriction if certain specified findings of fact are made.69 In
on the basis of race, color, or national origin...
(2) the totality of circumstances have not changed since issuance of the order
to warrant reconsideration of the order,
(3) no other remedy . . . would preclude the intentional and specific
segregation,
(4) the economic, social and educational benefits of the order have outweighed
the economic, social, and educational costs of the order,
then such plaintiffs shall be entitled to relief . . . from such order.
Id.
61. 80 U.S. at 147. After declaring that the jurisdiction-limiting statute enacted by
Congress infringed the independence of the judiciary, the Court stated that "[iut is of vital
importance that these powers [legislative and judicial] be kept distinct." Id.
62. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1976).
64. The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
No court of the United States ... shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute, except in strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter. . . nor
shall any such restraining order or ... injunction be issued contrary to the public
policy declared in this chapter ....
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
65. 303 U.S. at 330.
66. Id.
67. See S. 1760, supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
68. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), supra note 64, with S. 1760, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 5, 127 CONG. REC. 11,819 (1981), supra note 59.
69. The Norris-LaGuardia Act still allows a federal court to issue injunctions if:
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view of these similarities, one must ask what, if anything, distin-
guished S. 1760 from the Norris-LaGuardia Act so as to have re-
duced the former's chances of successfully surviving any potential
constitutional challenge.
The answer may be that the Norris-LaGuardia Act differs from
S. 1760 in that injunctive relief in a labor dispute may not necessa-
rily be a constitutionally required remedy, and in those labor dis-
pute cases where injunctive relief may be constitutionally man-
dated, the Act probably allows it.70 Busing, however, is a remedy
specifically fashioned by the courts to correct past unconstitutional
segregation. 7' Therefore, the constitutional validity of congres-
sional limitations on federal court jurisdiction to order busing does
not automatically follow from the constitutional validity of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. Instead, the constitutionality of S. 1760, as
[Flindings of fact [are made] by the court to the effect-
(a) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless re-
strained ...;
(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will
follow;
(c) That. . . greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of
relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;
(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's
property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). Compare this with the busing order dissolution provision of S. 1760,
§ 5, supra note 60.
70. Meserve, supra note 5, at 160-61, argues that the "Norris-LaGuardia [Act] is sus-
tainable because substantive power exists to issue labor injunctions if certain findings of fact
are made and injunctions are not . . . constitutionally required remedies." Id. See Eisen-
berg, supra note 11, at 527-28, where the author asserts the validity of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act based on the contention that "Congress can withdraw jurisdiction from all cases
except those in which a particular outcome is mandated by the Constitution." Id. The au-
thor notes that the Act may allow injunctive relief where the Constitution would seem to
compel it, and points to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976), as covering those circum-
stances where an injunction may indeed be constitutionally required. Eisenberg, supra note
11, at 528 n.173.
71. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Supreme
Court recognized the district court's broad power to fashion equitable remedies to
segregation:
If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations [under the Constitution], ju-
dicial authority may be invoked. Once a right and a violation have been shown, the
scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.
[A] school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally from other cases involv-
ing the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right.
The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the
condition that offends the Constitution.
Id. at 15-16.
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well as the other proposed anti-busing legislation, S. 1647 and S.
1743, may well depend upon whether busing is a constitutionally
required remedy72 in school desegregation cases, the denial of
which would amount to a denial of fifth amendment due process
guarantees.
Busing for the purpose of school desegregation is a remedy fash-
ioned by the courts for the purpose of eliminating racially segre-
gated public school systems, which the Supreme Court, in Brown v.
Board of Education,8 held to be a denial of equal protection. 4 In
the case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion, 7 5 the Supreme Court, upholding a lower federal court deseg-
regation order, implied that some remedies may be constitutionally
required. While the litigation was in process, the North Carolina
State Legislature enacted a statute known as the Anti-Busing
Law." The plaintiffs in the Swann case sought and received an
injunction against the statute's enforcement, 7 on the ground that
72. For a discussion of the proposition that there are constitutionally required reme-
dies, see Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109 (1969).
73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74. Id. at 495. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, declared that "[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and
others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the seg-
regation complained of, deprived of [equal protection]." Id.
75. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
76. Id. at 15. The Court recognized Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
as standing for the proposition that "school authorities are 'clearly charged with the affirma-
tive duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary [school] system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated .. '" 402 U.S. at 15 (quoting from
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. at 437-38).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176.1 (1978) (repealed 1981). The Act provided, in relevant
part:
No student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on account of race,
creed, color, or national origin, or for the purpose of creating a balance or ratio of
race, religion, or national origin. Involuntary busing of students in contravention of
this article is prohibited, and public funds shall not be used for any such busing.
Id. Compare this statute with S. 1647 § 3(a), S. 1743 § 3(a), and S. 1760 § 5, supra note 1.
The similarity in language between the aforementioned North Carolina statute and the pro-
posed federal legislation suggests that the latter would not survive a constitutional equal
protection challenge.
78. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 312 F. Supp. 503 (W.D.N.C. 1970),
aff'd sub nom North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971). This action,
seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the North Carolina Anti-Busing Law, was
brought as an ancillary proceeding connected with the school desegregation case of Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The North Carolina State Board of
Education appealed the district court's order, declaring the North Carolina state law uncon-
stitutional and granting an injunction against its enforcement, directly to the United States
Supreme Court. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board's motion to join in the appeal was
granted by the Court. 400 U.S. 804 (1970).
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it was an unconstitutional interference with the school board's per-
formance of its affirmative duty under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment,79 to eliminate racially segregated
school systems immediately.80 Despite having held the North Caro-
lina anti-busing statute unconstitutional, the district court stopped
short of saying that busing would be an appropriate remedy in all
school desegregation cases."1
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court upheld the district
court,82 declaring that because racial considerations are determina-
tive factors in establishing the existence of a constitutional viola-
tion, race must be considered in developing a remedy.s The Court
concluded that a flat prohibition against busing to achieve some
degree of racial balance in a unitary school system would be a hin-
drance to the ability of local officials to formulate effective reme-
dies for constitutional violations.8 4 Since the Supreme Court has
upheld a district court decision declaring an absolute prohibition
against busing for racial balance to be unconstitutional, it would
appear that busing, to some degree is a constitutionally required
remedy to the denial of equal protection embodied in "separate
but equal" public school systems.
Applying this conclusion, and comparing the language of the
proposed anti-busing legislation introduced in Congress8 5 with the
language of the invalidated anti-busing law of North Carolina 6 it
becomes apparent that if the proposed congressional bills had been
enacted and subsequently challenged in court, they too, should
have met the same fate as the North Carolina statute. The pro-
79. 312 F. Supp. at 504. The equal protection clause provides, in pertinent part, that
no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
80. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), where the Supreme Court, in
rejecting the school board's "freedom of choice" desegregation plan as ineffective, declared,
"[tlhe burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realisti-
cally to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id. at 439 (emphasis in original).
81. 312 F. Supp. at 510. The district court stated that "[a]lthough we hold these statu-
tory prohibitions unconstitutional as violative of equal protection, it does not follow that
'busing' will be an appropriate remedy in any particular school desegregation case." Id.
82. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
83. Id. at 46. The Court conceded that "the Constitution does not compel any particu-
lar degree of racial balance or mixing, but when past and continuing constitutional viola-
tions are found, some ratios are likely to be useful starting points in shaping a remedy." Id.
84. Id. The Court specifically noted that busing "has long been an integral part of all
public educational systems and it is unlikely that a truly effective remedy could be devised
without continued reliance upon it." Id.
85. See supra notes 57, 59.
86. See supra note 77.
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posed federal legislation, like the North Carolina statute in Swann,
contained an absolute prohibition against the busing of students to
achieve a racial balance. Such a prohibition, when imposed by a
state legislature, has been held to be a hindrance to the ability of
local officials to carry out their constitutional duty to erradicate
segregation, and amounts to a violation of the equal protection
clause. 7 Federal legislation containing the same prohibitions also
could be an unconstitutional impediment to citizens' enforcement
of their right to equal protection of the law under the United
States Constitution, 8 when viewed in light of historical state and
local resistance to the desegregation mandates of Brown and its
progeny; resistance which has not gone unnoticed by the Supreme
Court.89 In view of this resistance, Congress, had it enacted the
proposed anti-busing legislation, effectively could have deprived
the victims of segregated school systems of the only viable remedy
available to them - a federal court busing order. Since segregated
school systems have been held to be a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment,90 and busing has been
held required by the Constitution to be available to remedy equal
protection deprivations," it follows that the proposed congres-
sional anti-busing legislation, if enacted, would have been an inva-
lid exercise of Congress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.9" Congress would be exercising its legislative power to
87. See supra text accompanying note 84.
88. In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a District of Columbia school desegrega-
tion case decided the same day as Brown I, the Supreme Court pointed out that it had held
that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment precludes states from main-
taining racially segregated school systems, but noted that the fifth amendment, which is
applicable in the District of Columbia, has no equal protection clause. Nevertheless, the
Court reached a conclusion consistent with Brown I:
Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental
objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden
that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause. In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government. We hold that
racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the
due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
347 U.S. at 500 (footnote omitted).
89. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13-14, 21, and
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438, for examples of state and local resistance
and delay in implementing effective school desegregation plans.
90. Brown v. Board of Educ., (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
91. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971). See supra note 84
and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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permit evasion of the requirements of that amendment, rather
than to enforce its provisions, thus contravening the Supreme
Court's definition, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,"3 of the proper scope
of Congress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
It should be noted, however, that none of the proposed federal
anti-busing measures precluded state courts from ordering the
busing of students to achieve a racial balance, and thus from pro-
tecting the constitutional rights of aggrieved parties. Furthermore,
nothing in the proposed legislation precluded Supreme Court re-
view of desegregation decisions of state courts, so as to ensure
proper protection of federal constitutional rights. Consequently, it
might be argued that there would be no violation of due process by
restricting the jurisdiction of federal courts in these cases, because
there would be no absolute deprivation of a judicial forum for ag-
grieved parties. They can still plead their cause in a state court,
whose decision would be subject to United. States Supreme Court
review, since it would involve a question of federal law. However,
the possibility of United States Supreme Court review does not
appear sufficient to ensure the protection of federal constitutional
rights, given that Court's overburdened docket and the consequent
infrequency of Supreme Court review.' 4 As a result, state courts
not only would be free to dissolve previously granted federal court
busing orders,95 but also to refuse to order busing to remedy
segregation.
S. 1760 may have an additional constitutional hurdle to over-
come with its provision requiring dissolution of existing busing or-
ders."6 The major concern with this provision is whether or not it
infringed upon the independence of the judicial branch, something
which the Klein court declared Congress constitutionally powerless
to do.'7 The dissolution provision contained in S. 1760 arguably
would create a presumption against the validity of existing, court-
93. 384 U.S. 641 (1965). See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
94. See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 531. See also Meserve, supra note 4, at 161. In-
deed, the 97th Congress has recognized the Supreme Court's burden by passing the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). This Act estab-
lishes the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which will have new,
nationwide jurisdiction in the areas of patents and claims against the government, with the
aim of achieving uniformity of federal court decisions in these areas. See S. REP. No. 275,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
95. See infra text accompanying note 101.
96. S. 1760, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. § 5, 127 CONG. REC. 11,819 (1981).
97. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 519 (1872). See supra notes 34-35, 61
and accompanying text.
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imposed busing orders that are challenged by affected parties; a
presumption which could be rebutted only by the congressionally
specified factual determinations.9" This differs markedly from the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's exception to its jurisdictional restriction, 99
which specifies the findings of fact that must be made before the
restricted remedy, an injunction, may be granted, rather than spec-
ifying the factual findings which must be made in order to sustain
existing, previously granted judicial relief. The former may be con-
sidered a legitimate exercise of legislative power, which by defini-
tion entails the formulation and establishment of rights and duties
not already mandated by the Constitution. The latter could be
viewed as a congressionally required presumption against the va-
lidity of a previous exercise of the judicial power in protection of
constitutional rights. In essence, Congress would be commanding
the courts to invalidate previous court orders requiring busing for
desegregation, merely upon petition by the affected parties, unless
and until the parties intended to be protected by the original order
prove that the order was and is still necessary. 100 This appears to
be the type of legislative infringement of judicial independence
which concerned Chief Justice Chase in Klein, because not only
did the dissolution provision have the potential to require courts to
reverse previous decisions which had held that busing was a proper
remedy in specific cases, it also prescribed a rule for courts to util-
ize in making those reversals.10 That rule esentially would have
been that previously granted busing orders were to be presump-
tively invalid.
Another potential constitutional problem with S. 1760 was that
its dissolution provision would have allowed a party affected by an
existing busing order issued by a federal court to seek relief "in
any court,"'02 which presumably includes a state court as well as a
federal court. Consequently, the situation might well have arisen in
which a lower state court would issue an order overturning a fed-
98. See supra note 60.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). See supra note 69.
100. See supra note 60.
101. See 80 U.S. at 525. Chief Justice Chase, writing for the majority in Klein, sum-
marized the basis of the invalidity of the jurisdiction-limiting statute under review when he
asked rhetorically: "What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a
particular way?" Id. The Chief Justice later emphasized that "[ilt is the intention of the
Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the government - the Legis-
lative, the Executive and the Judicial - shall be, in its sphere, independent of the others."
Id.
102. S. 1760, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 127 CONG. REc. 11,819 (1981).
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eral district court order, and in some situations, such as those in
which a federal district court's busing order had been appealed to
the United States Supreme Court and upheld, would effectively ig-
nore the Supreme Court decision as well. Such a course of events
would seem to run counter to the supremacy clause ' if the busing
order were deemed to be a constitutionally required remedy in a
given case.
Thus, the proposed anti-busing measures, S. 1647, S. 1743, and
S. 1760, all potentially may have suffered from the constitutional
defect of violating due process.104 S. 1760, with its dissolution pro-
vision, possibly may have violated both the supremacy clause and
the separation of powers principle, which was the basis of the Su-
preme Court's invalidation of the jurisdiction-limiting statute in
Klein.10 5
B. The Anti-Abortion Bills
The proposed legislation that sought to limit federal court ju-
risdiction to issue any restraining order, injunction, or declaratory
judgments in cases concerning state anti-abortion laws, S. 158106
and S. 1741107 appeared to be a straightforward attempt to undo
103. The supremacy clause provides in pertinent part that the "Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
104. See supra notes 84, 88 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 101. This is not to say that S. 1760 would not be sustainable if it
did not contain an absolute ban on busing. If the findings of fact which the bill, as proposed,
required a court to make in order to sustain a previous busing order, see supra note 60, were
instead the findings of fact necessary to the issuance of any new busing orders, then S. 1760
arguably would be equivalent to § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. § 107
(1976), see supra note 69. Such a revision to S. 1760 would bring that bill within the guide-
lines of Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), where the Supreme Court, utilizing
the de jure - de facto distinction based on segregative intent, ruled that "a finding of
intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system
[creates] a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities
." Id. at 208. The Court noted further that:
If the actions of school authorities were to any degree motivated by segregative intent
and the segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the fact of re-
moteness in time certainly does not make those actions any less "intentional."
[I]f [the] School Board cannot disprove segregative intent, it can rebut the
prima facie case only by showing that its past segregative acts did not create or con-
tribute to the current segregated condition of the . . . schools.
Id. at 210-11.
106. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 287-94 (1981).
107. S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CoNG. REc. 11,528-30 (1981). S. 1741 was the
amended version of S. 158, which was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee's
468
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the effects of Roe v. Wade,108 a controversial Supreme Court deci-
sion. That decision declared that the fundamental right of privacy
encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to obtain an abor-
tion, e10 and that limitation of this right may only be justified by a
compelling state interest.1 The Court then analyzed the separate
interests involved with regard to the pregnant woman and the un-
born fetus, determining the points during pregnancy at which the
interest in the health of the mother and the interest in the poten-
tial life of the fetus each become "compelling." ''
The Court did not base its decision in Roe on any definition of
when life begins,112 but rather, arrived at its decision utilizing a
"fundamental rights" analysis.11 3 Yet, Congress, in its proposed
anti-abortion legislation, sought to establish that human life begins
at conception."' Having made this declaration, Congress then
sought to assert its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment to ensure states' compliance with that amendment's prohibi-
tion against depriving persons of life without due process of law,' 1 5
and to declare further that for fourteenth amendment purposes,
the term "person" shall include all human life as defined in the
proposed statute."' The proposition that life exists from concep-
Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers. See 127 CONG. REC. 11,528 (1981) (remarks of
Sen. Helms).
108. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
109. Id. at 153. The Court in striking down a Texas criminal abortion statute, declared
that the "right of privacy. . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
110. Id. at 155. The majority stressed that "[wihere certain 'fundamental rights' are
involved . ..regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest,' and ... legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legiti-
mate state interests at stake." Id. (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 162-64.
112. Indeed, the Court specifically backed away from attempting to define when life
begins, noting that "[w]hen those trained [in] medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable
to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowl-
edge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer." Id. at 159.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11. For a discussion of "fundamental
rights" analysis, see NOWAK, supra note 29, at 416-19.
114. S. 158, § 1 provided: "The Congress finds that present day scientific evidence
indicates a significant likelihood that actual human life exists from conception." Id. S. 1741,
§ l(a) declared that "[t]he Congress finds that the life of each human being begins at con-
ception." Id.
115. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in relevant part: "No State shall.., de-
prive any person of life ...without due process of law." Id.
116. S. 158, § 1 provided in pertinent part:
The Congress further finds that the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States was intended to protect all human beings. Upon the basis of these
findings, and in the exercise of the powers of the Congress, including its power under
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tion and is present throughout the pregnancy, was advanced in Roe
by the State of Texas,'17 but the Court refused to find that the
State's theory of life outweighed the pregnant woman's rights in
the matter. " " In view of the Court's response to that argument,
one is compelled to question whether the Court would agree that
Congress' adoption of a particular theory of life may override the
rights of the pregnant woman in an abortion case.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court noted that in nearly all instances in
which the word "person" appears in the Constitution the word has
a postnatal application only." 9 Based on this, and other pertinent
factors,' the Court concluded that the word "person" in the con-
text of the fourteenth amendment does not include the unborn.'2 '
This holding is an integral part of the decision in Roe; the Court
acknowledged that if the opposite were true, and the word "per-
son," as used in the fourteenth amendment, did include the un-
born, then the fetus' right to life would be protected. 22 The provi-
sions in S. 158 and S. 1741, declaring that the unborn are
encompassed by the term "person" as used in the fourteenth
amendment, 23 were an undisguised attempt to substantively alter
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the Congress hereby declares that for
the purpose of enforcing the obligation of the States under the 14th Amendment not
to deprive persons of life without due process of law, human life shall be deemed to
exist from conception, without regard to race, sex, age, health, defect, or condition of
dependency; and for this purpose "person" shall include all human life as defined
herein.
Id. S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 127 CONG. REC. 11,528 (1981) contained closely similar
language.
117. 410 U.S. at 159.
118. Id. at 162. The Court stated, "we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of
life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake." Id.
119. Id. at 157.
120. Among the factors which the Court considered pertinent in determining whether
the word "person" had a post-natal application in the context of the fourteenth amendment
was the finding that "throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed
with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect." Id. at 140. The
Court also went on to observe:
[A] woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she
does in most States today. At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and
very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity to make this choice was pre-
sent in this country well into the 19th century.
Id. at 140-41.
121. Id. at 158.
122. Id. The Court recognized that "appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is
a 'person' within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . If this sug-
gestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus'
right to life [is] then guaranteed specifically by the Amendment." Id. at 156-57.
123. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
Therefore, Congress, had it enacted this proposed legislation,
would have overstepped its authority in precisely the same manner
condemned by the Court in Klein, by interfering with the power
and independence of the judiciary.
124
Congress' attempt to declare in S. 1741 that each state has a
compelling interest in protecting the lives of persons within its ju-
risdiction whom it regards as human beings, 125 would not save the
proposed anti-abortion legislation. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 21 the
Supreme Court struck down a congressional attempt to determine
what a state's legitimate interests are. The Court invalidated the
section of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970127 which
would have extended the voting franchise in state and local elec-
tions to those above the age of eighteen. The legislation was based
on the premise that no legitimate state interest was served by the
age restriction. The Supreme Court, in striking down the legisla-
tion, asserted that it is not within the constitutional authority of
Congress to determine what is and is not a compelling state inter-
est for equal protection purposes, but that such a determination is
a matter of constitutional interpretation, more properly within the
province of the courts.1 28 This reasoning would be equally applica-
ble to the proposed anti-abortion legislation. A congressional dec-
laration of its perception of a state's compelling interest would not
correct the constitutional defects of S. 158 and S. 1741.29
Because both S. 158 and S. 1741 contained a severability
124. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Congressional enactment of S. 158 and
S. 1741 would not have been a neutral jurisdictional limitation, but rather an attempt to
prescribe a rule for deciding the merits of all future abortion cases by diluting the effect of
the decision in Roe v. Wade. See also supra note 35 and accompanying text. By enacting S.
158 or S. 1741, Congress would have "passed the limit which separates the legislative from
the judicial power," United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 519, 525 (1872), by attempt-
ing to overrule, by simple legislation, a Supreme Court decision of constitutional dimension.
It also would have contravened the well-settled principle of judicial review declared in Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803). In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall, finding
that a statutory conferral of jurisdiction which conflicted with that fixed by article III of the
Constitution must fall, declared that "[i]t is, emphatically, the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 70.
125. S. 1741, § 3 provided: "Congress further recognizes that each State has a compel-
ling interest, independent of the status of unborn children under the fourteenth amend-
ment, in protecting the lives of those within the State's jurisdiction whom the State ration-
ally regards as human beings." S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 11,529 (1981).
126. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
127. Pub. L. No. 96-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970) (amended 1976).
128. 400 U.S. at 204-05 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
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clause30 it is also necessary to analyze the constitutional validity
of the jurisdiction and remedy-limiting provisions of these pro-
posed enactments.131 These provisions would effectively strip lower
federal courts of jurisdiction to even hear a case involving a chal-
lenge to a state or local anti-abortion law, because they would deny
federal courts the jurisdiction to issue the only remedies appropri-
ate in such a case: declaratory judgments or injunctions against en-
forcement of the anti-abortion statute. Consequently, potential
plaintiffs would be limited to challenging such laws in state courts,
with decisions of those courts subject to Supreme Court review. S.
158 would not prohibit Supreme Court review of these cases, but
the question once again arises, as it does in the area of busing, as
to whether the mere possibility of Supreme Court review is suffi-
cient to guarantee the protection of federal constitutional rights,18
or whether state legislatures effectively would be freed to enact,
and state courts freed to sustain, anti-abortion statutes which
would not meet the guidelines of Roe v. Wade."'3 Due process
problems would arise because a state court, upholding the validity
of a state statute which violates the guidelines of Roe v. Wade,
could effectively deny the fundamental right recognized in that de-
cision: the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy without
state infringement.3 S. 1741 on the other hand, would specifically
require expedited Supreme Court review of cases involving chal-
130. S. 158, § 3 provided: "If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is judicially determined to be invalid, the validity of the remain-
der of the Act and the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances
shall not be affected by such determination." S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 127 CONG.
REc. 287-88 (1981). Section 6 of S. 1741 contains identical language. S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 6, 127 CONG. REC. 11,528-29 (1981).
131. S. 158, § 2 provided the following jurisdictional and remedial limitation:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no inferior federal court ordained and
established by Congress under article III of the Constitution of the United States
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, temporary or permanent injunc-
tion, or declaratory judgment in any case involving or arising from any state law or
municipal ordinance that (1) protects the rights of human persons between concep-
tion and birth, or (2) prohibits, limits, or regulates (a) the performance of abortions
or (b) the provision at public expense of funds, facilities, personnel, or other assis-
tance for the performance of abortions.
S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 127 CONG. REc. 287 (1981). S. 1741, § 4, contained identical
language, but added the provision "[t]hat nothing in this section shall deprive the Supreme
Court of the United States of the authority to render appropriate relief in any case." S.
1741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 127 CONG. REC. 11,528-29 (1981).
132. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
133. See 410 U.S. at 162-64, for the Court's description of the permissible scope of
state regulation of abortion.
134. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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lenges to anti-abortion statutes." 5 Arguably, this added assurance
of Supreme Court review could facilitate uniformity of constitu-
tional rules of law, and preclude potential due process problems.
However, whether even "expedited" Supreme Court review could
be obtained within the time limitations inherent in the case of a
pregnant woman challenging an anti-abortion statute is open to se-
rious question.1"6 Consequently, Congress, by enacting either S.
158 or S. 1741, would have exercised its power in violation of a
specific constitutional limitation on that power, i.e., the fifth
amendment due process clause.13 7 Congress effectively could have
freed the states to deny or abridge what the Supreme Court has
deemed to be a fundamental right, the right to an abortion,13 8 prior
to viability, the point at which the state's interest in protecting the
potential life of the fetus becomes compelling.
1 39
V. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Opponents of jurisdiction and remedy-limiting legislation
aimed at narrowly defined areas of constitutional law contend that
such legislation is an attempt to evade compliance with unpopular
or controversial Supreme Court decisions by a simple majority vote
in Congress, thus circumventing the more deliberate constitutional
135. S. 1741, § 5 provided in pertinent part:
Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from an interlocu-
tory or final judgment, decree, or order of any court of the United States regarding
the enforcement of this Act, or of any State law . .. that protects the rights of
human beings between conception and birth, or which adjudicates the constitutional-
ity of this Act, or of any such law. . . . The Supreme Court shall advance on its
docket and expedite the disposition of any such appeal.
S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5, 127 CONG. REC. 11,528-29 (1981) (emphasis added).
136. This concern is not alleviated by the possibility of non-pregnant women challeng-
ing state anti-abortion laws in the courts, because in situations such as this, plaintiffs'
standing to bring the action and the case's ripeness for adjudication would be at issue. No
effort will be made to analyze those issues here, but they are mentioned merely as potential
obstacles to the success of such a challenge when the plaintiff is not directly threatened with
injury as a result of enforcement of an anti-abortion statute. For a discussion of the ripeness
and standing doctrines see NowAK, supra note 29, at 64-66, 68-83. See generally United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (issues concerning injunction against enforce-
ment of Hatch Act prohibitions against political activity by federal executive branch em-
ployees not ripe for adjudication as to plaintiffs who had not been charged with violations of
the Act); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (party seeking judicial review must
show that he has sustained or is in danger of immediately sustaining some direct injury if
the challenged statute is enforced).
137. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
139. 410 U.S. at 163.
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amendment process. " " As can be seen from the above analysis of
the proposed legislation in light of previous Supreme Court deseg-
regation and abortion decisions, a substantive impact is a distinct
possibility. 14 However, the ability of the proposed jurisdiction-lim-
iting legislation to effect substantive changes in existing constitu-
tional law is directly related to two factors: (1) the willingness of
state judges to disregard Supreme Court precedent,' 4 and (2) the
possibility that state courts will interpret state constitutional coun-
terparts to the federal Bill of Rights so as to invoke even greater
protection for individual rights under state law than the Supreme
Court (and perhaps Congress as well) deems to be necessary under
the federal Constitution. 48 Some doubt has been cast on state
judges' willingness to ignore Supreme Court precedents by a reso-
lution adopted by the Conference of Chief Justices at its meeting
in, January, 1982, where, the state chief justices expressed serious
concerns over the proposed legislation. 144 With regard to the sec-
ond factor, at least one prominent contemporary jurist has noted a
trend in which state supreme court decisions are increasingly inter-
preting state constitutional provisions as guaranteeing citizens
greater protection of their individual rights than the United States
Supreme Court has held to be necessary under the federal Consti-
tution. 45 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court itself has rec-
ognized the right of states to grant such broader protection of indi-
vidual rights.146  These factors, in conjunction with the
constitutional requirement that state judges take an oath to sup-
140. See 68 A.B.A. J. 386 (1982); see also Meserve, supra note 4, at 160-61; see gener-
ally Eisenberg, supra note 11.
141. See supra notes 102, 109 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 95, 138-39 and accompanying text.
143. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HAuv. L. REv. 489 (1977). In his article, Justice William Brennan asserted that "the deci-
sions of the [Supreme] Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding
rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law. Accordingly, such decisions are not
mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state court judges and members of the bar
seriously err if they so treat them." Id. at 502.
144. See 40 CONG. Q. 211 (1982); see also 68 A.B.A. J. 386 (1982).
145. See Brennan, supra note 143, at 495. For a discussion of specific state court deci-
sions granting broader protection under state constitutions, see id. at 498-502. See also No-
WAK, supra note 29, at 21, where the authors note that "state courts are always free to grant
individuals more rights than those guaranteed by the Constitution so long as it [sic] does so
on the basis of state law. The federal Constitution establishes minimum guarantees of rights
and the granting of additional liberties does not violate its provisions." Id. (footnote
omitted).
146. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
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port the Constitution, 47 would appear to imply that it is unlikely
state judges will be an instrumentality of any effort to effect
changes in existing constitutional law short of the amendment pro-
cess. To the contrary, it would seem that state courts would per-
petuate the very decisions that the proposed legislation seeks to
overturn.
For the near term then, it appears that the proposed legislation
would not substantively alter existing constitutional law. However,
the state judges who today oppose the jurisdiction-limiting legisla-
tion, who would uphold controlling Supreme Court precedent in
the areas of busing and abortion, or who interpret state constitu-
tional provisions as imposing greater restrictions on state action in
these areas than either Congress or the Supreme Court thinks is
required by the federal Constitution, may become victims of the
electoral process despite, indeed perhaps because of, their adher-
ence to their oath to support the Constitution, 48 or their desire to
maintain the protection of individual freedoms under state consti-
tutions. The result could be state judges who are more sensitive to
the political forces at work in controversial cases, and a politicized
judicial system rather than one which insulates certain fundamen-
tal interests and rights from the majoritarian political process. At
that point, there could be a real danger of individual states effectu-
ating substantive changes to federal constitutional law, as declared
by the Supreme Court, resulting in non-uniformity in the mini-
mum federal constitutional protections to be afforded to individual
rights in the busing and abortion areas, and effectively emasculat-
ing the supremacy clause. 49 Challenges to the federal jurisdiction
and remedy-limiting legislation would naturally be made, thus pre-
cipitating a major constitutional crisis concerning the legislative
branch's jurisdictional control of the judicial branch. With a
framework of separation of powers, judicial review, and a constitu-
tional amendment process which has worked well since the birth of
the Republic, such a crisis would be a tragic and needless
eventuality.
147. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 provides in relevant part that "judicial Officers. . .of the
several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution .
Id.
148. See Meserve, supra note 4, at 161, where the author notes that "state judges are
not protected by federal constitutional guarantees of tenure and compensation and many
hold their position through periodic elections ... [and] they will be subject to ... the
unenviable choice between oaths and careers." Id.




The issue involved in the controversy over the proposed juris-
diction-limiting legislation is not whether busing or abortion is
"right" or "wrong". The issue is whether Congress may undo the
effects of Supreme Court decisions through jurisdictional manipu-
lation under article III. In the proposed legislation, Congress tread
dangerously close to infringing judicial independence, and sought
to directly overturn Supreme Court interpretations of the four-
teenth amendment. These facts, in conjunction with the proposed
withdrawal of jurisdiction from federal courts of first impression,
and in some instances withdrawal of Supreme Court jurisdiction as
well, showed a clear attempt by Congress to effect changes in es-
tablished constitutional law, while avoiding the cumbersome
amendment process. Although this attempt was couched in juris-
dictional terms, an area which to an extent has been recognized as
properly within Congress' purview, the Congress nevertheless
crossed the fine line between constitutional validity and invalidity
with the proposed legislation.
The proposed bills would have created the risk, perhaps inten-
tionally, that state court judges would yield to local political and
popular pressures to disregard controversial or unpopular Supreme
Court precedents. If state court judges refused to decide new con-
troversies as Congress would have liked them to, and that appears
to be the sentiment among the judges at this time, there would be
no immediate effect on existing constitutional law in the areas of
school desegregation and abortion. However, the possibility that
future state judges may ultimately fulfill Congress' apparent hopes
is quite real and quite dangerous. If in the future Congress seeks to
reintroduce such jurisdiction-limiting legislation, the possibility of
a major legislative-judicial constitutional crisis is very real as well.
Nicholas D. Krawec
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